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Phenomenology is a tradition of crises. Not
only is it a movement that sees itself on the
brink of modernity—a turning point in the
philosophical tradition of the West—but it is
also engaged in a constant struggle over the
starting point and target area of its investiga-
tions. Phenomenology has not become a fixed
system, because it defines itself as a project
that cannot become one. As Husserl often re-
marks, phenomenology—as a philosophical
undertaking—is a pursuit of an “absolute
foundation,” in which “no one line of knowl-
edge, no single truth may be absolutized and
isolated.”1 Hence, it is a process of constant
critique, repeatedly deciding anew what is pri-
marily evident and meaningful.2 Phenomenol-
ogy is an enterprise of constant separation—
crisis.
But as Jacques Derrida claims, the idea of
crisis is important for the phenomenological
tradition also in another sense. In his work Of
Spirit—a book that deals with the concept of
Geist (or its absence) in Heidegger’s work—
Derrida claims that it is perhaps the concept of
crisis that strikes a gap between Husserl’s and
Heidegger’s thinking. Derrida points out that
even though both wish to “awaken Europe and
Philosophy to their responsibility,” for
Heidegger this wake-up call “is not a discourse
on crisis.”3 For both, the idea of crisis signifies
a “loss of direction,” uncertainty about the
ends of the Western philosophy; however, ac-
cording to Derrida, Heidegger’s analyses do
remain “radically heterogeneous” with respect
to Husserl’s Crisis-works.4 He is not talking
about a mere difference in the ways approach,
but of a more profound separation:
One could even go further: through the appeal
Husserl makes to a transcendental subjectivity
... this discourse on the crisis might constitute
one of the symptoms of the destitution.5
What I would like to do in this essay is to ask
what is the nature of this separation. My point
here is not to argue against Derrida; on the con-
trary, I want to sketch what could be meant by
the “radical heterogeneity” in Husserl and
Heidegger’s thinking of the crisis.
I will argue that even though Husserl and
Heidegger always saw philosophical question-
ing in relation to the present situation, the
problem of crisis was not essentially a question
of the present. Their contemporary situations
were defined by a strong crisis-consciousness
which originated from the discussions of late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, but
their primary intention was not to offer a form
of contemporary criticism.6 Instead, the prob-
lem of crisis was primarily a question of tradi-
tion: what is the nature of our philosophical in-
heritance and what are our possibilities in
making a difference to it.
I will show that even though both Husserl
and Heidegger share a certain idea of philo-
sophical-historical teleology that constitutes
the unity of our philosophical tradition, what
separates them is the willingness and unwill-
ingness to accept this tradition as something
inescapable. For Husserl, a responsible re-
newal of the tradition can help us to overcome
the crisis, whereas for Heidegger, tradition is
essentially something that cannot be corrected
or renewed—but thought. Nevertheless, I will
show that Heidegger’s position does not lead
to a lack of philosophical responsibility, but to
its radical reinterpretation.
* * * * *
In Husserl’s philosophical work, the idea of
crisis appears in several forms: as the crisis of
philosophy, as the crisis of science (and espe-
cially of the human sciences), as the crisis of
reason or rationality, and finally, as an all-en-
compassing crisis of culture and humanity.
Even though the word “crisis” does not appear
in Husserl’s vocabulary until the 1930s, many
commentators—such as Tom Rockmore and
Philip J. Buckley—have stressed its implicit
role in his early philosophy and thus have ar-
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gued for the continuity and unity of Husserl’s
philosophical project.7 In this respect, the
word “crisis” merely gathers together the is-
sues that Husserl had worked with in his earlier
philosophy: most importantly, the criticism of
psychologism, historicism, and naturalism.
However, alongside the internal motivation of
crisis, we must also pay attention to the exter-
nal influences. As Husserl noted in his Vienna
lecture from 1935, he always saw himself pri-
marily as a “reactionary [to the crisis]”8—even
though as “far more radical” than his contem-
poraries. He never wanted to escalate this pop-
ular debate but to “root out the popular misun-
derstandings,”9 take up the challenge that the
ongoing crisis-talk had set forth.
One way of capturing the guiding idea of
Husserl’s early critical reflections is to say that
they were a response to an all-encompassing
“crisis” of reason or rationality. This unwanted
condition can be understood roughly in two
ways. First, as a consequence of physicalist
and naturalist approaches, our scientific ratio-
nality is defined by what Husserl calls “false
objectivism”: the absolutization of nature or
natural-scientific abstractions. In their prog-
ress, modern natural sciences rely on a certain
omission that concerns their foundations; by
operating with scientific abstractions such as
“atom” or “synapse,” they tend to dismiss the
process of meaning-formation upon which
they rely. In the words of late Husserl, the natu-
ral sciences “forget” the concrete lifeworld ex-
perience that forms their origin. Conversely,
the second sense of the crisis could be de-
scribed as “false subjectivism,” for in
Husserl’s view, a considerable part of modern
philosophy was in the process of abandoning
the whole idea of science as a rational pursuit
of necessary and all-embracing truths—this
for the sake of subjective preferences. Philoso-
phy and science were succumbing to an un-
founded relativism, for example, to the
historicist idea that there are no truths that
would transcend their respective cultural
frameworks, and would thus be valid in every
possible condition.10
This does not mean, however, that the rise
of these misguided “forms of rationality”
would have been only an inner problem of phi-
losophy. Already in his essay “Philosophy as
Rigorous Science” from 1911, Husserl was
convinced that naturalism does not represent a
problem only for the scientific enterprise, but
that it is “a growing danger for our culture,”11 a
threat for the life-form that Husserl calls Euro-
pean. This claim becomes understandable in
relation to Husserl’s definition of Europe. For
Husserl, Europe was never in the first place a
specific continent, a group of people or a title
for a set of shared values, habits, and customs,
but what he called a “spiritual form” (geistige
Gestalt),12 defined by the rigorous and critical
task (Aufgabe) that Greek philosophy had set
forth. For Husserl, this task was based essen-
tially and only on the idea that all life must be
led by reason—that whatever we believe or do,
and however we decide to arrange our commu-
nal life, we have to have specific grounds for
our beliefs and actions.13 These grounds are
nothing external to us but they lie at the very
heart of our subjectivity: the truthfulness of
our beliefs and the rightness of our deeds are
always given to us at a certain level of ade-
quacy, and our task is to judge and act to the
best of our knowledge and capabilities.14 It is
not the nature of our judgments or actions, but
the idea of self-responsible justification that
makes them rational.15
However, as human beings, we are never
completely transparent to ourselves. We tend
to develop beliefs, habits, and customs without
justifying them rationally: some people smoke
without having the faintest idea of why they do
so, while others have devoted their whole lives
to creating material prosperity without ever
considering what good it does. Obviously all
this is quite natural. It is however as natural to
find oneself in a situation where the ground-
lessness of one’s beliefs and habits starts to re-
veal itself. This can happen in the form of a
pang of guilty conscience or even as a deep
personal or existential crisis in which all of our
valuations begin to appear unfounded, that is,
without intuitive content. Thus to protect
against the total loss of value of our life, we
must become reflective of ourselves. We must
fight against the “natural” forgetfulness to
which we tend to succumb; in Husserl’s terms,
we must adopt the position of constant critique
that enables and motivates the process of re-
newal (Erneuerung).
With the concept of renewal—which
Husserl named as the “chief theme of all eth-
ics”16—he means simply the possibility to re-
sist the “loss of intuition” that has its origin in
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our subjectivity, but that takes place on differ-
ent levels of meaning-constitution: personal
life, religion, politics, science, and so on. With
the process of renewal, we have a possibility to
regain the lost intuitive content of our insights:
for instance, we can reduce the amount of air
travel we engage in once we have learned of its
harmful consequences to the environment, or
we can even give up our profession for the sake
of a more justifiable vocation. With this reflec-
tive potential of ours, we also have a way of re-
establishing the evidence of our “higher order”
insights such as scientific beliefs or political
practices. This is what being rational means
for Husserl: the ability to distance oneself from
oneself, to take an active stance towards one’s
judgments, practices, habits, and value-state-
ments.17 Hence, renewal is substantially an
active procedure that contends with the essen-
tial passivity in us.
The real danger of positivist and naturalist
movements was that they were an attack
against this idea of self-responsibility. One of
the most obvious examples of this was the rise
of behaviorist psychology which, to use John
B. Watson’s expression, recognized no essen-
tial difference between “a man and a brute”;18
the same could have been said of B. F. Skin-
ner’s radical determinism which, for instance,
proclaimed freedom to be merely an illusion.
These stances were dangerous for the simple
reason that they were an attack against what
Husserl calls the “autonomy of the spiritual”;19
they were undermining the possibility of vol-
untaristic behaviour and active renewal. Des-
cartes and the rationalism of the Enlighten-
ment still had faith in the traditional idea of
man as rational animal, that is, an essentially
self-responsible being, but for the philosophy
of the nineteenth century this fundamental
“faith in man’s freedom” was starting to col-
lapse.20 Naturalism and behaviorism claimed
that our conscious life is not the true ground of
our actions, but that we are merely victims of
circumstances: whether these are biochemical
processes, neurophysical mechanisms, or
some kind of herd instincts. This radical naï-
veté which not only crosses the limits of
reason, but willingly turns against the very
idea of rationality, is what constitutes the true
crisis.
It is exactly this line of thought that reaches
its fulfilment in Husserl’s later works on crisis.
Already in the beginning of the 1920s, Husserl
had criticized Oswald Spengler’s idea on the
decline (Untergang) of the West saying it de-
rived from a “passive understanding” of cul-
ture.21 In Husserl’s view, Spengler’s ideas were
depriving the European culture of its most es-
sential feature—self-responsibility—the abil-
ity to strive for infinite goals and to determine
its course actively. For the ideas of rationality
and responsibility do not concern only individ-
ual persons but also communities, nations, and
cultures in general; through critique and con-
stant self-renewal, communities—like indi-
viduals—have a possibility to adopt a form of
self-regulation (“the habitus of critique”22)
whereby their traditionally inherited values,
practices, customs, and habits are constantly
set into re-evaluation. This was actually the
culmination of Husserl’s late thought: he
aimed to show how the highest form of self-re-
sponsibility and renewal is not to be found in
the finite life of an individual but in the collec-
tive responsibility of the whole of humanity.23
Thus, according to Husserl, the whole de-
bate on crisis was defined by an insurmount-
able passivity whereby the crisis was seen as
an inevitable consequence—even as a punish-
ment for the European culture. This passivity
was something that he wanted to overcome:
The “crisis of European existence,” which man-
ifests itself in countless symptoms of a cor-
rupted life, is no obscure fate, no impenetrable
destiny. Instead, it becomes manifestly under-
standable against the background of the philo-
sophically discoverable teleology of European
history. . . . [It can] end in only one of two ways:
in the ruin of a Europe alienated from its ratio-
nal sense of life, fallen into barbarian hatred of
spirit; or in the rebirth of Europe from the spirit
of philosophy, through the heroism of reason
that will definitively overcome naturalism.24
In this respect, the prolific use of the word “cri-
sis” in Husserl’s later works can be seen, not
only descriptions of an empirical situation, but
also as an expression of the active role of phi-
losophy in regard to its tradition. Because even
though we have not chosen our historical situ-
ation, we are still responsible for the pre-con-
ceptions and prejudices that it contains. Our
task is to make comprehensible the historical
constitution process of our inherited tradi-
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tion—the teleology of history—and to pre-
serve its essential openness: the goals of his-
tory are never something completely
predetermined but always open to
reinstitution. Hence, by invoking the original
Greek connotations of “resolution” and “divi-
sion,” Husserl articulated not only the problem
but also the solution: our tradition is always
something that we have to bring into a crisis,
something to which we have to “make a differ-
ence.”
25 However, this decision does not lead
us outside the tradition, but to the responsible
renewal of the original idea of critical
philosophy.
* * * * *
What about Heidegger? The starting point
of this essay was a passage from Derrida in
which he claimed that Heidegger’s philosophy
was not “on crisis”—at least not in the
Husserlian sense of the word. This claim may
sound somewhat surprising, if we look at the
passages from Introduction to Metaphysics
that Derrida is talking about.26 Because what
Heidegger recognizes there as the source of the
crisis of modernity—which he defines as the
disempowering (Entmachtung) of the spirit—
is exactly the inability to question grounds: the
unwillingness to seek a rigorous founding of
science. What is more, according to Heidegger
this crisis stems from Europe itself. It is not the
case that Europe was about to lose its original-
ity owing to Asian or other influences, rather
the crisis is one of European rationality itself.
And like Husserl, Heidegger wants to awaken
Europe to realize this crisis-situation. The only
possibility for the salvation of Europe (what
Heidegger calls “the great decision”)27 lies in
“repeating and retrieving the onset (Anfang) of
our historical spiritual existence,”28 that is, the
beginning of Western metaphysics. So the
question is, is this not precisely what Husserl is
trying to do?
To understand and explicate the fundamen-
tal difference between Heidegger and
Husserl’s approaches to the crisis, I will take a
leading clue from one of Heidegger’s lecture
series from the 1930s, Basic Questions of Phi-
losophy (Grundfragen der Philosophie, WS
1937/38). In this lecture series, Heidegger in-
troduces the concept of crisis in relation to
what he names as two possible relations to his-
tory: one, that he calls historical consideration
(historische Betrachtung), and another, that he
calls historical reflection (geschichtliche
Besinnung).29 Whereas historical consider-
ation is interested in facts, states of affairs, and
the causal relations between them, historical
reflection is directed toward what Heidegger
calls the “basic experience” (Grunderfahrung)
behind them. For example, Galilean physics is
not separated from Aristotelian physics
merely by its “method” or “results,” but by its
different understanding or explication of its
basic categories such as space, movement,
rest, and so on.30 Therefore, historical consid-
eration does not treat history as a constant
progress but as what Heidegger calls the “tran-
sition of the same” (Verwandlung des Selben):
as different answers to the basic metaphysical
defini t ions of what is taken as real ,
meaningful, and evident. It is namely this idea
of crisis as a metaphysical event that
Heidegger wants to invoke:
The crisis . . . does not stem from 1933 or 1918,
not even from the reviled 19th century, but from
the beginning of the modern age, which was not
a mistake but a destiny and will be overcome
only as such.31
In the light of this short passage, we can see
that there are at least two features that demon-
strate the gap between Heidegger and
Husserl’s analyses.
The first one concerns the crisis as a particu-
larly modern event. As we saw, for Husserl the
crisis was manifested most clearly in the posi-
tivist, naturalist, and objectivist tendencies of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. However, according to Heidegger’s
historical reflection, the reason for this crisis
was farther reaching. The roots of philosophi-
cal objectivism are not to be located in the
nineteenth century, but at the “beginning of the
modern age,” that is, in the rationalism of the
sixteenth century that posited the human being
as a subject that is the fundamentum absolutum
inconcussum, the absolute ground of all
meaningfulness.32 This birth of modern sub-
jectivism was the starting point for the treat-





But once subjectivity is viewed as the foun-
dation of all meaningfulness, what happens to
its counterpart? What happens to the dimen-
sion that transcends this subjectivity—a di-
mension that could oblige human being and
give it meaning? It becomes nothing. Could
the crisis, then, be described as the unfolding
of nihilism? According to Heidegger, this is at
least how Nietzsche saw the matter. For Nietz-
sche, the history of Western philosophy was
internally directed toward its fulfilment, “Eu-
ropean nihilism,” which for him meant the an-
nihilation or devaluation of all “higher” truths
and values.33 This development had its origin
in Greek philosophy and its Christian reinter-
pretation in that both neglected the apparent
“lived world” for the sake of the eternal and
supersensual. According to Nietzsche, this
“true world”—originally manifested in
Platonist ideas and in the form of Christian
God—could no longer maintain its credibility
but was to be overcome by a radical subjectiv-
ism that could no longer be obliged to accept
an authority beyond itself but that set itself its
own truths and values. Thus for Nietzsche,
“European nihilism” also contained within it-
self a positive connotation that called for the
“revaluation of all values,” a way out of purely
negative beliefs (“We do not believe in God,”
etc.). This, of course, was the goal of Nietz-
sche’s Übermensch: the overcoming of
modern nihilism through the absolute and
totally self-sufficient “will to power.”
Heidegger credited Nietzsche with being
the first to recognize nihilism, not just as a con-
temporary moral-ethical phenomenon, but as a
development that defines the whole of Western
philosophy.34 Through this step, Nietzsche
pushed the whole problem of crisis into the do-
main of metaphysics and thus opened up a
space for true historical reflection. However,
according to Heidegger even Nietzsche was
unable to get to grips with the most intimate
cr is is—the most or iginal decis ion
(Entscheidung)—that defines the whole Occi-
dental tradition. For Heidegger, even Nietz-
sche could not confront the essence of nihilism
as the question of being and its relation to noth-
ingness: Why does being equal presence?
Why does “nothing”—that which is absent—
count for nothing? According to Heidegger,
this “forgetting” was characteristic not only to
modern philosophy but to the whole of West-
ern metaphysics, beginning from Parmenides,
Plato, and Aristotle—a metaphysics that had
ultimately understood the measure of all real-
ity in terms of absolute and constant presence,
and respectively, thinking (noein) in terms of
direct and immediate givenness of this pres-
ence.35 As Heidegger claimed, Nietzsche inter-
preted this ground not in terms of absolute
transcendence—not as a transcendent “idea”
or God—but as absolute subjectivity, which is
the self-sufficient foundation of all meaningful
reality. What modern subjectivism had ne-
glected, along with its Greek ancestors, was
precisely the absential dimension that
constitutes all givenness—the most funda-
mental decision between beings-as-present
and that dimension (being) which grounds this
presence.
We are not, however, interested in describ-
ing the character of nihilism in its totality—
this is far too big of a topic—but in its meaning
with regard to the problem of crisis. The sec-
ond question that arises from the previously
quoted passage concerns the possibility of
philosophical thinking with regard to the cri-
sis. For if we follow Heidegger by saying that
the crisis “was not a mistake but a destiny,”
does this conception leave any room for a
responsible attitude to the crisis?
Certainly, Heidegger’s late thinking is quite
often seen as being defined by an attitude ac-
cording to which there is nothing that philoso-
phy can do to make things better; that whatever
kind of devastation or deprivation we face, the
only possible course of action is to indulge
oneself in the tranquillity of Gelassenheit or in
a waiting for a future God. This “disinterested”
attitude is sometimes viewed as the opposite of
Husserl’s ideas of philosophy’s responsibility
and active resistance: whereas Husserl wanted
to solve the crisis of mankind by pushing Eu-
rope closer to its roots, Heidegger was quite
satisfied with just reflecting upon it.36
This does not mean, however, that philoso-
phy could do nothing. For these notions of
“passive resistance” were not used to describe
an indifference toward responsibility for the
world but the peculiar possibilities of philoso-
phy with regard to the tradition. For if the most
original crisis of thinking consists of the deci-
sion (Gr. krinein) between beings-as-present
and its Parmenidean antipode, non-being, then
the task of thinking cannot consist in the over-
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coming of this pres-absential interplay, but of
its unfolding or re-opening.37 To put it differ-
ently, the most fundamental decision of think-
ing is not a matter of activity or passivity but of
remembering or retrieving (wiederholen). As
Heidegger remarked in a discussion of Ernst
Jünger’s Über die Linie, “with regard to the es-
sence of nihilism, there is no prospect or can be
no meaningful claim of healing.”38 The most
intimate possibility of crisis that lies in the na-
ture of humanity cannot be overcome in its es-
sence, for it is the foundation upon which all
meaningfulness rests. It is our destiny; not in
the sense of historical predestination but in the
sense of unavoidable starting point for the
constitution of sense.
Thus for Heidegger the real danger was not
nihilism itself but its absolutization: “The spir-
itual decline of the earth has progressed so far
that people are in danger of losing their last
spiritual strength, the strength that makes it
possible even to see the decline.”39 The de-
structive force of modern nihilism lies in its
tendency to avoid all originary questioning by
annihilating everything that transcends pure
human subjectivity, everything that could be
experienced as something that gives meaning.
As for Nietzsche’s Übermensch, for the mod-
ern man there are only subjective needs and
preferences—“brute animality”—but really
nothing that could overcome these needs and
preferences. Thus, what Heidegger means by
the task of thinking in these “times of need,”
can not be a mere activity of the subject but
something more like a willingness for prepara-
tion that could help us overcome forgetfulness
and confront the crisis in its essence.40 As
Heidegger later adjusted his views, it is actu-
ally highly questionable if there can be such a
project as overcoming (Überwindung) nihil-
ism (which was essentially the same thing as
the crisis) but only a possibility of surmount-
ing (Verwindung) it, recovering from it, getting
through it.41
* * * * *
To return to Derrida’s original claim about
the “radical heterogeneity” of Husserl and
Heidegger’s relation to the crisis, both philoso-
phers saw the crisis as a situation that con-
cerned the essence of humanity and laid claim
to preserve something essential in our human
existence. For both, the crisis points toward a
definite resolution or decision with regard to
the tradition from which it arises. However, in
relation to the possibilities and responsibilities
of philosophy, a radical difference can be
found. For Husserl, the crisis was to be over-
come by a responsible renewal of the idea of
rational humanity—established with the be-
ginning of Greek philosophy—whereas for
Heidegger, a mere renewal of this first begin-
ning was not enough. According to Heidegger,
Greek philosophy was already nihilistic in the
sense that by grounding itself on the idea of
stable and constant presence, it counted the
absential dimension that founds this presence
for nothing. This essence of nihilism must be
opened up again so that it can be experienced
as the dimension that lays claim on human be-
ing. This is what Derrida means when he says
that Heidegger might have viewed Husserl as a
“symptom of the crisis.” Husserl still tried to
find a way out of the crisis by returning to the
idea of active subjectivity as the ultimate
ground from which all responsibility emerges.
Whereas for Heidegger, all responsibility rests
on nothing other than our ability to respond: in
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